This article seeks to revisit Gramsci"s legacy on counter-hegemony, the subaltern and affectivity, by focusing on the implications of his cutting-edge position on the role of subaltern feelings in the formation of an "emotional pedagogy" of activism in the context of higher education. Three insights follow from this analysis. First, Gramsci"s work facilitates an understanding of how affect and ideology are entangled. Second, Gramsci"s concepts of counter-hegemony, the subaltern, and the organic intellectual in relation to his views about the unity of reason and emotion offer points of departure for activism, especially small acts of everyday life that often go unnoticed. Finally, Gramsci"s concern with the emotional potential of subaltern subjects shows how important it is to consider subaltern passions as political resources that challenge hegemonic conditions and formulate strategic counter-hegemonic responses in higher education.
Introduction
Marxist perspectives-particularly in their critique of globalisation, neo-liberalism and terrorism-are perhaps more useful than ever before to those who are engaged in the struggle for global social justice and world peace (Allman, 2010; McLaren and Farahmandpur, 2005) .
Although there has been some scepticism about the relevance of Marxist perspectives in the post-1989 and post 9/11 era, McLaren and Farahmandpur argue that linkages between capitalism, globalisation and terrorism make such perspectives valuable, because the struggle against injustice and oppression takes different forms in global relations of power. Struggles Notebooks; by considering the legacy of these Gramscian concepts in the aftermath of the so called affective turn (Clough, 2007) , we will gain valuable insights on the potential of constituting an "emotional pedagogy" of activism in higher education.
The article is divided into four parts. The first part presents a brief review of major developments in the affective turn in the humanities and social sciences and clarifies the concepts of "emotion" and "affect" in contemporary discourses of critical theory. The next part discusses the role of emotions in social movement activism. The third part of the article explores Gramsci"s position regarding the role of affectivity in relation to counter-hegemony, the subaltern and the organic intellectual. The final part of the article sets out some reflections on the formation of an "emotional pedagogy" that mobilises activism in higher education.
These reflections move along two directions: (1) they provide a general appraisal of the significance of Gramsci in the aftermath of the affective turn; and (2) they refer specifically to the contribution of Gramsci"s work in grounding the counter-hegemonic potential of an "emotional pedagogy" of activism.
The 'Affective Turn' and Critical Theory
Broadly speaking, the "affective turn" (Clough, 2007) is used to denote a renewed scholarly interest in emotions, embodiment, and affectivity in the social sciences and the humanities.
The affective turn marks "critical theory"s turn to affect", as Clough writes, "at a time when critical theory is facing the analytic challenges of ongoing war, trauma, torture, massacre, and counter/terrorism" (2007: 2). While there are clearly different approaches in the affective turn that range from psychoanalysis, post-Deleuzian perspectives, theories of the body and embodiment to affective politics, there is more emphasis to take into account intersections of the social, cultural and political with the psychic and the unconscious. The affective turn, then, marks a shift in thought in critical theory through an exploration of the complex intersections of discursive practices, materiality, social and cultural forces, and individuallyexperienced but historically and culturally situated emotions and affects.
An important aspect of debates in the affective turn is the differentiation between "affect" and "emotion". Post-Deleuzian scholars like Massumi (1996) insist on the importance of distinguishing emotion from affect. Thus, emotion is understood as the more individualised and socialised content that is shaped through specific social, cultural and linguistic expressions. Affect, on the other hand, is defined as the body"s ability to affect and to be affected and thus is not just subjective or individual; it does not necessarily have a narrative, but rather refers generally to the body"s capacity to act, to engage, to resist, and to connect.
Emotion thus represents a form of assimilation, a closure and containment of affect within symbolic means, whereas affect is considered along the lines of a bodily intensity resistant to domestication, always evading a final structuration (Hook, 2011) .
A crucial possible error that comes to light, however, as Hook explains, is the assumption that affect bypasses or exists prior to the symbolic and "that it hence warrants distinctive analytical attention potentially set aside from [the] symbolic" (2011: 111) . Also, emotion is perceived as socially determined, the effect of social conventions-an interpretation that fails to account for the emotion"s disruptive and transformative potential. Massumi (1996) , in particular, separates the rational, conscious and narrativised aspects and names them emotion, while reserving the term affect for non-conscious and non-rational components. Leys (2011) critiques this distinction made by Massumi and other affect theorists who "suggest that the affects must be viewed as independent of, and… prior to, ideology-that is, prior to intentions, meanings, reasons, and beliefs-because they are nonsignifying, autonomic processes that take place below the threshold of conscious awareness and meaning" (437).
Massumi, argues Leys, "privileges the "body" and its affects over the "mind" in straightforwardly dualist terms" (Leys, 2011: 468) .
Other theorists emphasise that affect is a synthesis between body and mind, emotion and reason (Hardt, 2007) . Affects are always embedded in acts and practices; thus, they are not autonomous processes, but they constitute an integral part of the practical activities with which bodies relate to other subjects and objects (Reckwitz, 2012) . Therefore, the distinction between affect and emotion makes sense if it introduces a degree of nuance that renews theorisations about the prospects of transformation and the changing entanglements of the political, the cultural, the social and the psychic. For example, if the emphasis is on the body, then it may make more sense to talk about the affective politics of embodiment. Thus, affect is not autonomous and pre-social, as Massumi suggests, but it is produced by people and between them in specific social and political contexts; at the same time, Massumi"s approach is not completely rejected, because his emphasis on the body and on the expression of affects creates some valuable openings to think about the impact of affect on politics and subjectivity.
Other recent scholarship in critical theory has emphasised the entanglement between emotion and affect, or the discursive and the psychic, highlighting the complex relations among power, emotion, affectivity, and subjectivity. For example, Ahmed (2004) uses the term "affective economies" while Gandhi (2006) proposes the notion of "affective communities" to describe how emotions bind subjects together into collectivities; both Ahmed and Gandhi theorise what the sociality of emotions and affects means in terms of historical changes and power configurations. Also, Rosenwein (2002) uses the term "emotional communities" to denote how emotional expressions and feeling rules are interwoven: "what these communities (and the individuals within them) define and assess as valuable or harmful to them; the evaluations that they make about others" emotions; the nature of the affective bonds between people that they recognize; and the modes of emotional expression that they expect, encourage, tolerate, and deplore" (842).
All of these terms-affective economies, affective communities, emotional communitieshighlight that what is felt "is neither internally produced nor simply imposed on us from external ideological structures" (Rice, 2008: 205) , but rather this new scholarship theorises that affects and emotions cannot be thought outside the complexities, reconfigurations and rearticulations of power, history and politics (Athanasiou, Hantzaroula and Yannakopoulos, 2008) . All in all, the critical issue that is emphasised by recent work in the affective turn is how psychic and embodied elements are entangled with historical, cultural, social and political norms and conventions. Affects and emotions shape and are shaped by "the political contours of our social imaginaries" (Rice, 2008: 206) . What is remarkable, as shown later in the article, is that Gramsci anticipated several of these developments both in the affective turn and in social movement theorising on the emotionality of politics, especially the idea of the entanglement between affect and ideology, and how feelings reproduce hegemonic norms or invigorate counter-hegemonic practices.
The Role of Emotion in Social Movement Activism
Until twenty years ago, the dominant model in social movement theory was the rationalchoice framework, that is, it was assumed that political protest was grounded on rationality; talking about feelings when referring to political protest was quite unpopular and was treated with suspicion (Jasper, 2011) . As Jasper explains, theories such as feminism, psychoanalysis and cultural constructionism have gradually begun to offer useful tools for understanding the emotions of politics, especially by suggesting that emotions are an important aspect of social and political life and thus are crucial to the formation and mobilisation of social movements.
The emerging subfield of emotions and social movements during the last two decades has produced important theory and research into the ways that emotions are entangled with activism and political protest. A brief historical overview of this subfield will help to see its gradual development and will clarify the conceptual moves made over the years concerning the role of emotion. Jasper (1998) was one of the first scholars who explicitly theorised the role of emotions in social movements. As he noted, emotions are central "for understanding one corner of social life: the collective, concerted efforts to change some aspect of a society that we label social movements" (399). Jasper suggested that protest and activism are filled with a variety of emotions that not only inspire the effort towards change but also shape the whole movement itself, including its tactics, organisational forms, and outcomes. Through his distinction between those emotions that are "transitory responses" to external events (e.g. anger, indignation) and those that are "underlying affects" (e.g. loyalty to family, friends or nation), Jasper asserted that emotions are not only part of social events but they also shape the goals of our actions in the form of underlying emotional attachments to certain ideas or visions.
Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta (2001) and Goodwin and Jasper (2004) advocated a cultural approach to social movements that has at its core the notion that emotions are intimately involved in the processes by which people come to join social movements. According to this approach, emotions are crucial in the creation of social networks of protest and they shape the collective identity of a social movement. For example, moral outrage against injustice and the joy of envisioning a new and better society are very much relevant to the moral intuitions, values, and felt obligations from participating in a movement towards that end. Social movements, then, are processes within which emotions can be created or reinforced as attempts to elaborate particular visions towards a better society (see also Aminzade and McAdam, 2002) .
Contributors to Flam and King"s (2005) edited collection have extended theoretical and empirical work on emotions and social movements until then by focusing on the prospects and challenges associated with attempts to express, regulate and ignore emotions relating to protest and collective action. For example, in his contribution to Flam and King"s edited collection, Eyerman (2005) discusses the emotionality of practices of protest and the ways in which the "performance" of opposition (i.e. how protest is performed through particular actions) is linked to the moral values of the mobilisation. Also, Summers-Effler"s (2005) and King"s (2005) insights into the value of solidarity-ascertaining rituals and practices of emotional reflexivity respectively provide new ways of thinking about the problem of emotional sustainability within activist movements (see also Cox, 2009 ).
Other works by social-movements scholars highlight different dimensions of the relation between emotions and activism. For example, in his study of anti-corporate globalisation protests, Juris (2008) argues that emotion is not incidental to activism; rather, emotion is strategically deployed by organisers to strengthen commitment and solidarity. Juris shows how there are different emotions involved within a protest movement, especially when one"s life is put on the line; that is, while there are some emotions associated with "institutionalised" forms of protests, there are very different emotional responses produced in other forms of activism. Similarly, Chatterton, Fuller and Routledge (2007) indicate how particular feelings such as anger and indignation are or may be harnessed within activism to cultivate hope for change; emotions, suggest Chatterton et al., enable transformative encounters with others to struggle for social justice goals. Also, Gould (2009 Gould ( , 2010 , who has studied AIDS activism in the 1980 and 1990s, emphasises the bodily qualities of feelings and the need to articulate what she calls "emotional common sense"; her analysis utilises a Gramscian framework to highlight the importance of passion in political process.
Finally, a recent special issue of the journal Emotion, Space and Society (2009) has focused on activism and emotional sustainability (see Brown and Pickerill, 2009a) . Contributors to this special issue have further expanded the research agenda on how emotions inspire or deter different forms of political and social activism by adding new directions of investigation; these directions include issues such as: the importance of building spaces of activism through emotional reflexivity (Brown and Pickerill, 2009b) ; the contribution of everyday, personal, affective bonds and small acts (what are called "implicit activisms") in creating and sustaining activism (Horton and Kraftl, 2009 ); the multiple ways in which emotional becomings are interconnected across spaces of activism (Askins, 2009) ; and the implications of the politicisation of emotion in the public sphere in terms of how social hierarchies are or can be resisted (Wilkinson, 2009 ). These contributions do not merely show the relation between emotion and activism but pay attention to the multiple complexities that arise from analysing the consequences of recognising the power of emotion as a mobilisation resource.
In summary, this brief review of work on the role of emotions in social movement activism highlights two important points. First, emotions have an important role to play in activist movements; many scholars now accept that emotion is a motivational political force that forms affective bonds which initiate and sustain activist efforts and political protest. Second, there are multiple complexities involved in the ways in which emotions are linked to protests and activist movements; this is an emerging field of study, but factors such as the provision of supportive spaces for emotional reflexivity and the encouragement of implicit activisms in everyday life seem to help the sustainability of individual and collective resistance and protest. These two points have important implications for the development of an "emotional pedagogy" that guides counter-hegemonic practices. As Gould explains: The next part of the article focuses on how Gramsci"s work in Prison Notebooks is helpful in re-framing some of the discussions taking place in the affective turn and the social movement theorising on the emotionality of politics and thus makes an important contribution toward the development of an "emotional pedagogy" of activism.
Antonio Gramsci: Counter-hegemony, the Subaltern and Affectivity
One of the most important contributions of Gramsci"s work is his position on the relationship between subaltern ways of feeling and counter-hegemony. Gramsci recognises that counterhegemonic resistance necessarily involves struggling over the hearts and minds of people, their attitudes, beliefs, and emotions about the world (Reed, 2012) . Any revolution, he writes, "presupposes the formation of a new set of standards, a new psychology, new ways of feeling, thinking and living" (1991: 41). As Fischman and McLaren (2005) point out, Gramsci"s framework acknowledges that both ideology and counter-hegemony are understood as embodied, felt and lived. I would here like to delve deeper into the place of affectivity in some of Gramsci"s foundational concepts to argue that one of the advantages of using his work-especially in the aftermath of the affective turn and the social movement theorising on the emotionality of politics-is that it helps us gain a more nuanced understanding of the entanglement between affect and ideology and its implications.
First of all, counter-hegemony is essentially the process that challenges normative views about social and political reality-e.g. the idea that capitalism is the only viable economic and political arrangement that is available (see Gramsci, 1987) . According to Gramsci, this moral and intellectual process of counter-hegemony is also an affective one, because praxis and understanding are rooted in "feeling". As he writes in Prison Notebooks, "The popular element "feels" but does not know or understand; the intellectual element "knows" but does not always understand, and in particular does not always feel" (Gramsci, 1987: 418) . Gramsci here makes a distinction between the "people-nation" that "feels" and the intellectuals who "know" and suggests that one does not really know without feeling, just as one does not really feel without knowing; feeling, understanding and knowing are all entangled together (Levinson, 2001) . For counter-hegemony, then, this "feeling" is necessary in understanding how people make sense of their world and their daily lives, and most importantly, how they resist subaltern consciousness (Reed, 2012 ).
Gramsci"s concern with the affective dimensions of ideology and counter-hegemony, and particularly his understanding of the way that capitalism as an ideology is affective links the individual with the social formation through the intensities and activities of affect. Thus, affect becomes an important aspect that motivates counter-hegemonic practices among individuals as well as between individuals and the social forces governing their conduct-an idea that has been further developed much later by other Marxists theorists, most notably Raymond Williams (1975 Williams ( , 1979 . But it was Gramsci who argued forcefully about the pivotal role of affect in societal transformation; this is evident, for example, when he emphasises that intellectuals, as leaders of counter-hegemony, must be able to feel, understand and appreciate people"s psychology:
[W]ithout feeling the elementary passions of the people, understanding them and therefore explaining and justifying them in the particular historical situation and connecting them dialectically to the laws of history and to a superior conception of the world, scientifically and coherently elaborated-i.e., knowledge. One cannot make politics-history without this passion, without this sentimental connection between intellectuals and people-nation. In the absence of such a nexus the relations between the intellectual and the people-nation are, or are reduced to, relationships of a purely bureaucratic and formal order (Gramsci, 1987: 418) .
The intellectual, in order to know something politically and socially, not merely abstractly or philosophically, must understand it with feeling and passion (see Fontana, 2002) . Passion, in other words, is necessary for counter-hegemony; similarly, feeling is an important component of hegemonic status quo. These forms of emotionality of politics function as practices that stipulate how individuals and social forces are connected.
As Reed (2012) observes, Gramsci anticipates developments in social movement theorising on the emotionality of politics through his analysis of ideology and counter-hegemony as containing feeling rules. Hochschild (1975) has used the term "feeling rules" to refer to the emotional norms for appropriate and effective social interaction. Feeling rules, she writes, "define what we should feel in various circumstances" (Hochschild, 1975: 289) , thus they reflect power relations and are techniques for control and discipline of human differences.
But it was Gramsci (1987) who argued much earlier that forms of control-i.e. coercion and consent-are not only moral and intellectual but also emotional processes of achieving hegemonic status quo; these processes include feeling rules about how to "interpret" social reality. Similarly, changing the world requires feeling the passions of the people to break the "emotional hegemony" (Jaggar, 1989 ) that is established.
In general, affect is the "missing term" that might explain why certain ideologies take hold and not others or how (Harding and Pribram, 2002) through affective investments, ideologies are internalised and naturalised (Grossberg, 1992) and thus to subvert them dominant affective investments have to be replaced by other affective connections that are subversive.
Without these novel affective connections that provide the link between the personal and the political, the individual and the public, the leaders and the subaltern, counter-hegemony would fail. As Reed writes, "Counter-hegemonic leaders, then, must be mindful to align themselves with the subaltern in a way that resonates with their passions (emotional lives and understanding) as well as with their lived experiences" (2012: 11). The understanding of subaltern feelings and how they are embodied in ideology is central to the very unfolding of counter-hegemonic practices.
For Gramsci, resistance is a sign of subaltern discontent and discomfort; however, he recognises that this discomfort is already always co-opted unless the "organic intellectual" (specialised intellectuals that grow organically within each class) turns resistance to agency (Fischman and McLaren, 2005 ). Gramsci"s term for the organic intellectual denotes the leader who helps subaltern groups become critically reflexive of existing cultural and political activities. As he writes, the organic intellectual helps "make intuition more penetrating", and informs "deliberate reflection" (Gramsci, 1987: 171, 139) . The role of organic intellectuals, then, is to make sure that passion for change is "disseminated" (1987: 113); without disseminated passion, critical reflection is not possible to lead to productive counter-hegemonic practices. For passion to play an effective role, it requires the emotional and political preparation of subaltern groups by the counter-hegemonic organic intellectuals (Reed, 2012 ). One could argue, then, that Gramsci suggested a form of "critical emotional reflexivity", as it has become known in the aftermath of the affective turn (King, 2005; Zembylas, 2013) .
Finally, counter-hegemony, as a political and affective practice with transformative implications, implies for Gramsci an "educational relationship" (1987: 157) between the teacher and the student that goes beyond a typical scholastic relationship. For example, the role of the teacher as an organic intellectual is to make knowledge both historically and affectively meaningful by incorporating the emotional experiences of the subaltern groups and offering opportunities to critically reflect on them. One has to imagine an "emotional pedagogy" in which each individual and group comes to know themselves by interrogating emergent patterns of thinking, feeling and living, and creating counter-hegemonic agency through resisting emotional hegemonies in society. The new dimension of this argument is the recognition that counter-hegemony is not simply a "rational" process; rather, it is a critical and holistic learning process that prepares individuals to critique and transform the ways in which emotional hegemonies position individuals within structures of dominance or relations of power and maintain these structures through affective means. The last part of the article delves deeper into the implications of Gramsci"s ideas for the development of an "emotional pedagogy" of activism in higher education.
Gramsci's Contribution to the Development of an 'Emotional Pedagogy' of Activism in Higher Education
Gramsci"s conceptualisation of counter-hegemony and the subaltern represents an attempt to integrate individual experiences into social and cultural analysis. Gramsci"s work draws attention to the ways in which discourses and practices of affect and emotion may work to consolidate and interrogate subaltern subjectivity. Perhaps his most important contribution in social movement theorising on the emotionality of politics is the notion that effective counter-hegemony contains feeling rules that frame how ideological conditions are interpreted and undermined. An important pedagogical question that guides my discussion here, then, is: How does Gramsci"s work help teachers and students at the higher education level to interrogate the link between affectivity and subaltern subjectivity and form activist positionalities that authorise some feelings and de-authorise others? I will argue that Gramsci"s position on how passion works in subalternity opens up significant theoretical and practical possibilities in higher education.
First, Gramsci"s conceptualisation that affects and ideology go together encourages the development of a critical orientation towards one"s emotional, cultural and social reality. It allows for certain aspects of lived experience, such as the emotions, to be viewed as having specific effects (Harding and Pribram, 2002) . Thus, for example, if the channelling of affects is too predictable or fixed and leaves no space for alternative routes, then the potential for change may get lost. This is what Gould suggests when she writes that "[a]ffect […] greases the wheels of ideology, but it also gums them up" (2010: 33). Gramsci shows us that there is no contrast between affect and ideology, but rather that we should take their relation seriously without blocking the prospects of counter-hegemonic practices. Such critical orientation is effectively accomplished by transforming the dialectical contradiction between affect and ideology and beginning to recognise them as "dialectically constitutive of transformative knowledge" (Reed, 2012: 13) .
One way of doing so includes the development of spaces for critical emotional reflexivity as starting point from which to cultivate a critical awareness of social, cultural and emotional reality, and, ultimately, grow a new type of knowledge that is transformative and praxis oriented. The notion of "critical emotional reflexivity" is utilised as a concept and praxis that not only acknowledges how reflexive processes are deeply emotional, but also emphasises the importance of interrogating how emotion discourses establish, reinforce or undermine power relations (Zembylas, 2008 (Zembylas, , 2013 . Critical emotional reflexivity constitutes a pedagogical approach in higher education that may examine how public discourses are deeply emotional and produce certain social exclusions and injustices.
For example, critical emotional reflexivity as a pedagogical approach in higher education takes the form of critiquing what it means to be patriotic or how it feels to pay higher taxes to increase funding for poor schools. In general, critical emotional reflexivity may function as a "pedagogical tool" with which higher education students can critically interrogate their emotion-laden beliefs, exposing how socialised emotions inform the ways in which one recognises what and how he or she has been taught to see and act (or not to see and act), and empowering transformation at the micro-level (Boler, 1999 (Boler, , 2008 Zembylas, 2007) . The purpose of critical emotional reflexivity is to invite students to leave the familiar stories of learned habits, beliefs, thoughts and so on, and analyse how selectivity of one"s vision and emotional attention constitutes particular subjectivities.
Moreover, as a pedagogical approach in higher education, critical emotional reflexivity provides spaces for teachers and students to initiate and sustain what Horton and Kraftl, (2009) term implicit activisms. Implicit activisms are "activisms which are politicised, affirmative and potentially transformative, but which are modest, quotidian and proceed with little fanfare" (Horton and Kraftl, 2009: 21) . This definition includes actions that may be considered insignificant by mainstream accounts of activism and yet they constitute invaluable enactments of resistance and social justice. For example, showing care for those who suffer through modest empathetic acts and dispositions or taking a firm stance against public behaviours that are discriminatory or racist constitute simple forms of implicit activism. These individual everyday acts seem, at first glance, not to have any dramatic effects; however, they can challenge and transform conventional understandings of culture, power and politics (Giroux, 2002) .
Integrating the concept of critical emotional reflexivity with implicit activism in higher education acknowledges both the entanglement between affect and ideology and the ways in which this operates in an ongoing process of reproduction and resistance. Gramsci"s work on the relationship between subaltern ways of feeling and counter-hegemony, then, enhances our concept of emotions and affects as "strategic" forces that are deployed toward change. This idea implies that teachers and students in higher education may need to constantly re-evaluate their commitment to social justice by reflecting on their everyday actions to engage in socially just gestures and behaviours in support of vulnerable people and groups. Critical emotional reflexivity and implicit activism work both as spaces and as strategic approaches that help students and teachers create and sustain an oppositional stance on important social issues. For this to occur, students and teachers must allow their emotional histories and testimonies to be critiqued in relation to social and political structures as well as their consequences in everyday life.
Consider, for instance, the context of post-apartheid South Africa. An "emotional pedagogy" of activism presupposes orienting learning towards the acknowledgment of the multiplicity and often contradictory feelings and understandings between the traumatised Black and White individuals and groups (Jansen, 2009) 3 . Jansen is very clear about not distributing trauma equally, but he recognises that Blacks and Whites carry their own emotional histories and testimonies, and are injured for different reasons and in different ways. White students, for example, may feel resentment for being vilified for their parents" history; Black students may feel resentment when they realise that very little has changed since the apartheid era.
The complexity and diversity of these feelings have to be acknowledged by everyone involved in this situation-by facilitating a process in which all students engage in critical emotional reflection about their social locations, how these condition their life in variant ways, and how they can generate other ways of knowing and being in the world. Some great works on resentment, the right to be guilty and the right not to forgive are emerging in the context of teaching in higher education (e.g. see Leibowitz et al., 2010; Macdonald, 2013 ).
Gramsci"s work is valuable, precisely because it shows how social change arises from new ways of feeling about the world; these are not imposed on the subaltern but develop organically and strategically from within the ranks of the subaltern, and thus the task of the teacher-student relationship is to encourage new manifestations of agency (Reed, 2012 ). An expanded notion of agency encourages "simple" acts to be used by students and teachers in their everyday lives. These small acts of activism are very much aligned with Gramsci"s understanding of the intellectual as not someone segregated from the society, but rather as someone who establishes an organic connection with the feelings and understandings of a community. Such an alignment "ensures the emergence and channelling of socio-affective ties within a counter-hegemonic movement [that are] necessary components for its stability, as well as its genuine, forward, and progressive trajectory" (Reed, 2012: 11) . An "emotional pedagogy" of activism in higher education, therefore, contains an emotional logic that challenges the present regime of feelings, outlooks and worldviews.
Presently, there is a whole industry of therapy-and emotion-based knowledge and skills aimed at preparing the subject to be properly employable (Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009 ). The field of higher education is caught up in imperatives to offer the educated subject a series of personal skills and behaviours (such as "emotional intelligence") in the interest of neo-liberal employability agendas (see also Amsler, 2011) . The "conventional" approach in the field holds that emotion is the opposite of reason. From the one end which claims that emotion is disruptive and irrational and has no place in higher education to the other end which emphasises that the educated or employable subject must exhibit certain emotional skills and behaviours, the bottom-line is one and the same: the championing of dichotomies between emotion and reason, a crude reductionism, the neglect of the intersection between emotion and socio-political structures in society, and finally the discounting of the historical roots of this master narrative based on a paradigm of emotional self-restraint. interactions, yet they constitute a terrain of social control, struggle and resistance. An "emotional pedagogy" of activism in higher education has something important to offer, because it asserts that these issues need to be placed at the heart of counter-hegemonic practices and policies in higher education. The fundamental task is therefore not to teach students how to feel about themselves, but rather to enable them to understand why they have certain feelings in a particular social and political setting; why, perhaps, they are not supposed to feel otherwise; and how to critically imagine conditions in which radical alternatives may be possible (Amsler, 2011) .
Conclusion
To conclude, there are three main insights emerging from Gramsci"s theorising on counterhegemony, the subaltern and affectivity to ground an "emotional pedagogy" of activism in higher education. First, his work facilitates an understanding of how affect and ideology are entangled; this entanglement reveals how ideological discourses and practices are deeply affective and embodied and function to maintain or resist the status quo. Second, Gramsci"s concepts of counter-hegemony, the subaltern, and the organic intellectual in relation to his views about the unity of reason and emotion offer points of departure for activism, especially small acts of everyday life that often go unnoticed. Gramsci"s focus on the power of passion reveals the strength of critical agency by providing educators and students with a foundation on which to promote critical emotional reflexivity and implicit activisms in higher education.
Finally, Gramsci"s concern with the emotional potential of subaltern subjects shows how important it is to consider subaltern passions as political resources that challenge hegemonic conditions and formulate strategic counter-hegemonic responses.
Counter-hegemonic education, therefore, is to be rooted in subaltern affectivity. As Reed suggests, "The problematic of action organic intellectuals face, as such, is not to discard the subaltern, but rather to transfigure it, channel its passion, and pedagogically engage it to effectively challenge the [hegemonic] social order from the bottom-up" (2012: 24). An "emotional pedagogy" of activism that incorporates these insights from Gramsci"s work is one that ceases to understand emotions and affects as isolated individual experiences or as antagonistic to reason, but rather reimagines them as resources of power and change, operating in complex networks of social, cultural and political relations. The promotion of positive attitudes and affectivities need Gramsci"s "disseminated passion" in universities to encourage the radical intellectual and emotional transformations that change "naive" 
